Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464), a German philosopher and cardinal from the Moselle, gave one of his Latin treatises the name of a cut stone. Naming a book after a beryl might lead a reader to expect an account of its origin, colour or value. Nicholas needs remarkably little of that information. What interests him is the moment someone holds the worked stone to the eye and sees something through it.
What cutting adds to the stone
Beryl is a bright, white, transparent stone. It is given a shape both concave and convex, and the person looking through it reaches what was previously invisible.
– Nikolaus von Kues, De beryllo, 1565, p. 267.[1]
Transparency alone will not do the work of this example. The beryl has been given a shape that requires two contrary descriptions. The same lens curves inwards on one side and outwards on the other. Someone using it has no need to choose between the two. Taken together they describe the single instrument through which that person is looking. What makes the stone interesting here is the way it draws attention beyond its own attractive appearance.
An instrument for the mind
In the very next sentence Nicholas imagines what such a beryl would be like if it could be fitted to the eye of the mind. This time the paired extremes are the greatest and the least. Someone able to think them together might come closer to the indivisible origin of things for which he is searching. The optical comparison by itself does surprisingly little to solve that difficulty. It does, however, give readers a familiar action to return to during a demanding argument. In the first chapter Nicholas expressly invites them to exercise their own judgement. In the end each must hold the beryl to their own eye.